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Abstract
Service discovery and secure and safe service usage are
essential elements in the deployment of home and personal
networks. Because no system administrator is present,
setup and daily operation of such a network has to be auto-
mated as much as possible with a high degree of user friend-
liness. To achieve this goal many systems sacrifice security
and privacy such, that services can be discovered and used
unauthorized or a person’s privacy may be breached. In this
paper we present a security mechanism that seamlessly in-
tegrates with service discovery and usage. Exchange of keys
and certificates is combined with messages used for service
discovery. Services messages themselves are encrypted and
authenticated, and casual receivers cannot read them. Al-
though encryption and decryption of messages takes extra
time, the combined protocol poses minimal communication
overhead and hence can be used even in small devices.
1 Introduction
Advances in network technology enable the large scale
deployment of always connected devices at low costs. In the
not so distant future the Internet of Things [1] will give us
the possibility to “Google our shoes” in the morning if we
cannot find them immediately. Somewhere in the network
a service exists that knows where your shoes are or knows
where to search for them. This service only needs to be
found by prospective clients, which is the task of a service
discovery mechanism. It is clear that –automatic– service
discovery is mandatory in a dynamic environment where no
system administrator is present, our home being the perfect
example.
A home network is not solely used anymore for con-
necting personal computers, but also to convey music and
video, to switch lights, etc. Also, the home network isn’t a
single (e.g. IP based) network string anymore. It may be
extended with other network segments like WLAN, Blue-
tooth, X10 home automation, sensor networks (e.g. Zig-
Bee), etc. These new uses pose new challenges concerning
security. Though a home network seems, and is considered
as such by many, a closed non-open environment without
the need for security other than at the perimeter (i.e. gate-
way and firewall), it is not. Some scenarios to illustrate this:
• A wireless network is not confined by the walls of an
apartment, so neighbors can not only monitor what is
going on, they might be able to intrude and use services
they are not meant to, like switching lights.
• We may grant house guests access to web browsing
through their own PDA, but restrict them otherwise.
• The remote control can present different functionality
to its current user, or even restrict functionality, de-
pending on who is using it. So parents are allowed to
watch a different set of TV channels than their chil-
dren.
• Some devices will be carried wherever the owner goes,
e.g. mobile phone or PDA. When used at home, where
they double as remote control, they will reveal them-
selves for the purpose to be discovered by the system.
But once outside, they should be discrete or else oth-
ers may infer information their owner wants to keep
private, e.g. the presence at the location and time of
a robbery. This is not as farfetched as it may sound:
already the presence of GSM mobile phones in cer-
tain base cells is used as evidence in court. The use
of short range radio makes localization even more fine
grained. Or, in the Netherlands trials are taking place
where people swallow smart pills to measure internal
temperature. Without doubt this is essential to monitor
one’s medical condition (at home), but a bank could
reject an application for a loan because the –secretly
discovered– presence of such a pill may indicate a se-
rious illness and be considered a risk.
From these examples it becomes clear that a home network
is not open. Access to it should be controlled at all times,
based on the current context. Context depends on the ser-
vice being asked for, the device and person asking for the
service, location, time of day, etc. Secondly, every service
discovery message can breach a person’s privacy, even if it
doesn’t reveal this person’s identity.
Service discovery is necessary, but it should be used with
care, balancing ease of use and security and privacy. Secure
service discovery protocols must ensure confidentiality and
data integrity. Authentication and access control are meth-
ods to do so. This is not the case in service discovery pro-
tocols presently available. If they offer security at all, the
imposed overhead prevents deployment in small unattended
resource-lean devices. In most cases security is delegated to
higher layers or to the application. Although at the applica-
tion level this may ensure access control and encryption of
data, at lower levels messages are exchanged freely, giving
away information that should have been kept private.
This paper proposes a secure service protocol for home
networks. Security is tightly coupled with service discov-
ery. It uses messages exchanged by the existing service dis-
covery protocol and so no extra messages are needed.
In the remainder of this paper we will give an overview
of service discovery principles and protocols. After that the
secure service discovery protocol is presented, followed by
a discussion of future work and the conclusion.
2 Contributions
Service discovery and secured service usage are not new.
After a service is discovered, layers higher in the network
stack may ensure security by exchanging encrypted mes-
sages. However, the discovery process itself is open and
receivers can monitor and analyze the nature of services
on offer or those searched for. In addition, other informa-
tion like the owner’s identity and her whereabouts can be
deduced. The security mechanism we propose seamlessly
integrates with service discovery and service usage. The
exchange of keys and certificates is combined with mes-
sages used for service discovery. Service discovery mes-
sages optionally can be encrypted and authenticated, and
casual receivers cannot read or interpret them. A tamper
proof trusted module embedded in the device provides cer-
tificates for authentication and does encryption. The public
keys initially used in the message exchange are distributed
by the home gateway to trusted devices only.
3 Service Discovery Overview
Service discovery may be considered the third genera-
tion of name discovery systems. ( [2]). A name discov-
ery system allows to discover objects in a distributed sys-
tem. Properties of an object are stored as attributes asso-
ciated with the name of the object. The first generation
name discovery systems were real name services: name
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based queries return the attributes associated with the name.
Directory services belong to the second generation: at-
tribute based queries return the name associated with the
attributes. Their use generally is limited to a static infras-
tructure of directories and servers in a computer based en-
vironment. The third generation name discovery –service
discovery– accommodates dynamic environments that con-
tain not only PCs, but all types of (consumer) devices and
embedded systems. Here, service discovery should provide
self-configuration and self-healing properties to the net-
work with a minimum of manual administration and main-
tenance. In this context a service is a certain functional-
ity offered by servers to users and applications. A service
doesn’t necessarily need to be associated with one device.
It may migrate from one device to another, or it may be of-
fered by a changing group of devices (as is often the case in
wireless sensor networks).
3.1 Service discovery architecture
Service discovery comes in two basic architectures, reg-
istry (Fig. 1) and non-registry (Fig. 2) based. In the reg-
istry based architecture a registry (also: repository or di-
rectory) contains all information on users and services in
the network. Every user and service has to register with
the registry when it becomes active in the network (“Reg-
istration”). When a user wants to use a service it asks the
registry if the service is available (“Search”). If the service
is registered, the registry replies with a reference to the ser-
vice (“Service link”). The user will access the requested
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Figure 3. Active service - reactive user
service directly via the given reference without any further
intervention from the registry (“Usage”).
When no registry is present (in a non-registry based ar-
chitecture), the user sends a broadcast to search for a ser-
vice. If the service is available and it receives the broadcast,
it will send the reference to the requested service to the user.
When a user becomes active in a registry based network,
it has to know the location of the registry. One way to do so
is to give the registry a fixed name or address known to all.
But note that the registry is a service that can be searched for
as in the non-registry based case. Both methods, sometimes
combined, are applied in current service discovery systems.
3.2 Service discovery communication
The previous section introduced the two classes of ser-
vice discovery architecture and their basic interaction. Ac-
tual communication is more complex, because all parties
can be pro-active, reactive or both. A party is pro-active
if it sends –unprovoked– messages, e.g. to announce its
presence. It is reactive if it only responds to other party’s
announcements or requests. An example with a pro-active
service and a reactive user is shown in figure 3. The service
broadcasts its presence at regular intervals to the network.
When a user enters the network, or becomes active in the
network, it waits until it receives an announcement of the
service it is looking for. Only then it will unicast, not broad-
cast, a message to the service. In the example the service is
a registry to which the new user wants to register. Note that
before the announcement the user did not know where to
find the registry.
A service or user can be both pro-active and reactive.
E.g. if a potential registry becomes active it can wait dur-
ing a certain time for announcements from an already active
registry. If it does not receive such an announcement it will
declare itself the registry and announce its presence. This
is a characteristic situation when a network is initialized or
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Figure 4. Subscription and notification
recovering from a failure.
Two phases can be distinguished in the interaction be-
tween services and users. The first one is the discovery
phase just described, in the second phase the service is ac-
tually used. As in the discovery process, services and users
can be pro-active as well as reactive. A pro-active user
requests for a service every time it wants to use it, e.g.
polling the temperature sensor in the room. In contrast to
this polling of services is the subscribe/notify mechanism.
After finding the service of its choice, the user subscribes
to the service. Depending on the type of subscription, the
service sends a notification to the user at regular intervals
or when parameters change. E.g. the service sends the sub-
scribed user the new value of the room temperature if it has
changed. This is shown in figure 4.
Parties in a service discovery process can be pro-active,
reactive, or both. When a party is pro-active it actively
broadcasts its messages, announcing its presence, request-
ing services, etc. But even if a device is reactive it may give
its presence away, because it is mandatory in some proto-
cols to react to certain messages e.g. [3]. If such a device
is associated with a person, indiscriminatively broadcasting
and reacting on messages, the person’s whereabouts can be
deducted even if communications are encrypted. New ser-
vice discovery systems therefore must not only ensure data
confidentiality by means of encryption, they also must be
prudent in their communication to ensure privacy, and ac-
tively control access to devices and services.
4 Secure Service Discovery
Security and protection of privacy are essential features
of a modern service discovery system. They are neverthe-
less lacking in many service discovery protocols in use to-
day. Systems or protocols which have security features in-
clude Jini [4], UPnP [3] and Bluetooth [5]. However these
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are not very lightweight and suitable for resource-lean de-
vices at home, or are tightly coupled to one network tech-
nology. In the following we will show how the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [6] can be mapped onto and tightly
coupled with the service discovery protocol and subsequent
usage of services.
4.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a public key cryp-
tographic system in use in well known protocols like SSH
and SSL. It allows two parties to anonymously establish a
shared key. The key exchange is executed whenever there is
a need to secure an outgoing message and there is no secu-
rity context available between the two communicating par-
ties. Figure 5 shows the sequence of messages. First of all
both Service and User will publicize their public key. Based
on each other’s public key and their own private key Service
and User calculate a shared secret. Note that the calculated
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shared secrets for both parties are the same. From that mo-
ment on the shared secret can be used to send encrypted
messages to the other party. Because the use of asymmetric
keys is a slow process, often the first encrypted message is
used to exchange a faster symmetric key to be used in the
remainder of the session.
This original form of Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks. Therefore certificates can be in-
cluded in the messages to certify that the used public keys
are indeed genuine. The authenticated variant of the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange is known as the Station-to-Station
protocol. It establishes a shared key with mutual authenti-
cation of the parties and mutual explicit key authentication
We did not elaborate on how public keys are dissemi-
nated. They could be broadcasted, or sent to a central au-
thority, where they are available for others on request. In
a home network the obvious place to store public keys etc.
would be some central server, e.g. the residential gateway.
If we assume that one party wants to communicate with an
other, the sequence of messages could be as depicted in fig-
ure 6. Service initiates a session by sending its public key
to User. This message is referred to as the ”Ping” mes-
sage. User then responds by sending its own public key
(possibly encrypted with the previously received Service’s
public key), also known as the ”Pong” message. From now
on Service and User can exchange data encrypted with the
common shared secret (”Pung”).
4.2 Service Discovery with Diffie-Hellman
Comparing figure 6 with figure 3 shows that the service
discovery message sequence is very similar to the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. Figure 7 demonstrates that both
protocols can be combined indeed. The announcement mes-
sage from Service is combined with the Diffie-Hellman
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Ping message, while the Pong message is combined with
the register message from User. Combining service discov-
ery messages with security messages is not only valid for
announcement and registration, but for all other service dis-
covery messages as well.
The security features heavily rely on the trustworthi-
ness of the proofs of registration and the confidentiality of
cryptographic key material. Devices should therefore be
equipped with a temper-proof security module (e.g. smart-
card) that handles all security-critical operations. The se-
curity module also represents the identity of the device in
which it is installed (Figure 8).
In order to facilitate the zero-configuration of devices,
the device manufacturer that produces devices with a hard-
ware security module, will initialize the security module
with its initial credentials, i.e. the manufacturer will ini-
tialize the signing key pair of the security module, and will
make sure that the device has a valid certificate. The service
discovery protocol precedes any other communication in
the system and therefore all security parameters must be ini-
tialized during discovery of new devices and services. The
initial key agreement ”piggybacks” the message exchanges
of the service discovery protocol. This means that two de-
vices, P1 and P2 perform the key agreement protocol as part
of the service discovery protocol, thus making the service
discovery protocol a secure service discovery protocol.
During the secure service discovery process six distinct
actions can be distinguished:
1. Send Ping: Device P1 sends out an initial message, the
Ping message. This Ping message includes two parts: a
message part which will contain service discovery in-
formation and cryptographic key material which will
allow the receiver of the Ping message to establish a
common secret. Next to the message part, the Ping
message contains an authenticity proof. This proof
protects the integrity of the Ping message, and enables
its receiver to verify that the sender of the Ping mes-
sage is indeed P1.
2. Receive Ping: The receiver of the Ping message, de-
vice P2, verifies the authenticity of the message, and
processes its message part.
3. Send Pong: If P2 decides to produce a response to the
message part, it has the possibility to compute a cryp-
tographic key K which P2 will share with P1 as soon
as P1 has processed P2’s Pong message. The Pong
message is a reply message to the Ping message.
4. Receive Pong: If P1 receives the Pong message, it
first verifies the authenticity of the Pong message. If
the Pong message comes from a device that P1 trusts,
or which it is allowed to communicate with, P1 can
proceed. Once the information has correctly been de-
crypted, P1 can proceed with the service discovery
protocol.
5. Send Data: If the service discovery protocol necessi-
tates a second message sent from P1 to P2, P1 uses
the shared secret to derive encryption and integrity-
protection keys to protect the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the information, respectively. If the confi-
dentiality of the information is to be protected, P1 en-
crypts the information for P2, and authenticates it with
the freshly calculated integrity-protection key. This in-
formation is then sent to P2.
6. Receive Data: If P2 receives an encrypted and/or au-
thenticated message, it retrieves the correct shared key,
derives from this key the decryption and integrity-
protection keys, and uses them to validate the authen-
ticity of the incoming message, and to decrypt its pay-
load.
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After receiving the Ping, P2 may decide not to react and
thus not to send the Pong. This decision can vary over time,
depending on context, even with the same devices P1 and
P2. E.g. P1 and P2 are a TV and a remote control belonging
to the same household. If the remote is used by the parents
it will allow other TV channels than when it is used by one
of the children. (P2 ”knows” who is using it because a PIN
is used, or some biometric characteristic.)
When a newly acquired device is brought into the house
for the first time it is still untrusted and will not work. Only
after learning each other’s identity and setting –default–
policies, the house will trust the new device and the de-
vice will trust the house. This process of ”imprinting” is a
(manual) one-time action –”Touch-and-Go”. If after some
time the device is removed from the house (e.g. sold) the
imprinting needs to be reversed. The device will become
untrusted again and can be imprinted once more by an other
house. This way of authentication is the Resurrecting Duck-
ling policy described by Stajano and Anderson [7].
Figure 9 is just one possible implementation of access
control for a typical registry-based home network, other
configurations are possible as well. P1’s and P2’s actions
are checked and enforced by an access control mechanism
based on the current set of policies. The access control
mechanism consists of two parts: the Policy Decision Point
(PDP) and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). In the ex-
ample the registry, PDP and PEP are situated in the same
residential gateway. Both devices (User and Service) are
imprinted and registered at the registry. When User wants
to use a certain service it will ask the registry for a service.
If such a service exists the registry will check with the PDP
whether User is allowed to use the service. If so, it will send
User a link to the service. If not, it will reply that such a ser-
vice is not available. After receiving the link to the service
(located at Service), User sends a request for the service to
Service. There, the usage of the service is controlled by the
PEP, who will check current policies at the PDP.
4.3 Implementation
The secure service protocol is developed as part of the
TEAHA platform [8] [9]. TEAHA implements a hetero-
geneous registry based home network. It allows interoper-
ability between different types of network. Secure service
discovery is one of the main features of the system.
Experiments showed that performance of the secure ser-
vice discovery protocol is mainly determined by the perfor-
mance of the security engine. It is the security engine that
stores credentials. It signs and encrypts messages on re-
quest. A part of the secure engine is a tamper proof module.
In our experiments we used an integrated USB smart-card
and reader for this purpose (Gem eSeal @ 5 MHz.). The
initial connection to the card has a typical delay of 400 ms.
Reading credentials (8 Bytes) from the card takes about 22
ms., while 3-DES encrypting of 64 bits takes 35 ms, exclud-
ing the data transfer. RSA signature generation is around
250 ms.
Some delays seem to be long (initial connection: 400
ms.; RSA signature generation: 250 ms.). However, these
actions are only necessary sporadically. For instance, RSA
signature generation is only required during session set up
and service registration. During a session the overhead
of encrypting, decrypting and checking credentials is only
small. Because the security messages piggyback service
discovery messages, these messages need to be extended
with some extra data fields. The overhead of sending these
slightly longer messages is negligible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that home networks are be-
coming more and more vulnerable for attacks from outside.
And if taken outside the home, devices may be a threat to
the privacy of the person who is carrying them. The major-
ity of current service discovery systems do not implement
security measures at all, or only in a limited way. They may
restrict access but will still expose their presence by sending
service discovery related messages.
We have introduced a secure service discovery system,
based on the authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
security modules and imprinting. It will ensure device au-
thentication, data authentication and data confidentiality.
Policy decision points and policy enforcement points con-
trol access to devices and usage of services. Also they con-
trol when and how to use and react to service discovery mes-
sages, thus protecting the privacy of the person who is using
a device.
The secure discovery protocol and access control are im-
plemented in the TEAHA platform. PDPs and PEPs are
6
fully functional, however a full policy management system
is lacking and will be subject of future research. Policies in
the current implementation are simple rules set manually.
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